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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## LOG-JAM IN PEACEMAKING BROKEN AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE

IN his radio address of December 30, reporting on the results of the Moscow Conference of December 16 to 26, Secretary of State Byrnes made no pretense that the agreements reached at that conference by the United States, Britain and Russia were ideal, or covered all the matters that had brought about controversies between the three great powers. The important thing, however, as Mr. Byrnes pointed out, is that the Big Three negotiations which, at the London Council of Foreign Ministers seemed to have come to a dead end, have been resumed; and resumed in an atmosphere of greater effort to understand respective divergences of views.

**COMPROMISE ON PEACEMAKING.** So far as Europe is concerned, the most welcome news is that the Big Three have adopted a procedure of peacemaking closely modeled on the proposal made at the close of the London Council of Foreign Ministers by Dr. Evatt, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has become known as an indefatigable champion of the rights of small nations\*. This procedure is to consist of three stages: first, the drafting of peace treaties by the United States, Britain and Russia with Italy (France to participate in this instance), Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria; and by Britain and Russia with Finland (the United States did not declare war on Finland). Second, these draft treaties will be submitted to a peace conference which, in addition to the Big Three, as well as France and China (the latter two have been invited to sponsor the conference), will be attended by "all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military force against enemy states," this conference to be held not later than May 1, 1946. Third, upon conclusion of this conference and consideration of recommenda-

tions, the Big Three (and, in the case of the treaty with Italy, also France) will draw up final texts of the peace treaties.

This procedure attempts to reconcile the view strongly held by Russia (and almost equally strongly by the United States) that it is the great powers which decided the outcome of the war in Europe, and thus are entitled to rule on the terms of peace settlement, with the prevailing sentiment of the public in the United States and Britain that small nations should have an opportunity to express their views about the peace terms, especially since many of them were the first to suffer from Hitler's aggression. It is true that the Big Three are not bound by the recommendations of the nations participating in the peace conference—but Mr. Byrnes assured the small nations that "certainly the United States would not agree to a final treaty which arbitrarily rejected such recommendations."

The chief problem of peacemaking in Europe is the position of France which, except in the case of the treaty with Italy, will be treated as some French critics point out, on the same footing as Ethiopia—and will have no initial voice in the negotiation of peace treaties with the countries of the Balkans, in which France has been traditionally interested as a counter-weight to Germany. Difficult as it obviously is for France to accept what appears to it a position of greatly diminished influence on the continent, French statesmanship should consider two points of paramount importance: France's security from renewed attack by Germany, and retention of its primacy as cultural leader of Europe. If the United Nations Organization, whose General Assembly opens in London on January 10, succeeds in assuring the security of France as well as other countries—and it can do so only if the United States, Britain and Russia can find a basis for long-term cooperation—then

\*V. M. Dean, "New Approach Needed to Rebuild Big Three Unity," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, October 12, 1945.

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the French will not be in such urgent need of military alliances east of Germany as they were before 1914 and again after 1919. And once France no longer feels under pressure to maintain the military establishment and structure of foreign loans previously required by its policy of eastern alliances, it will be in a better position to concentrate its creative energies on those cultural achievements which have made Paris in the past the acknowledged world center of culture and taste.

#### TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS.

The process of peacemaking should be speeded by the decisions adopted in Moscow concerning changes in the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, which hitherto had threatened to create a conflict between the Western powers and Russia. Once the requirements set by the Big Three have been fulfilled, the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments, already recognized by Russia, will be recognized by the United States and Britain, thus clearing the way for conclusion of peace treaties with them. The Rumanian government of Premier Groza is to be enlarged by the inclusion of one member each of the National Peasant party and the Liberal party. This reorganized government shall then declare that "free and unfettered elections" will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. It shall also give assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion and association, regarded as essential by Western democracies. The performance of these tasks is to be supervised by an Allied commission composed of the American and British Ambassadors to Moscow and Russian Foreign Vice-Commissar Vishinsky.

The situation in Bulgaria, where elections held on November 18 had resulted in an 88 per cent vote for the Fatherland Front, composed of the Agrarian, Social Democratic and Communist parties, is more complicated because, as Mr. Byrnes frankly stated, the Soviet government regards these elections as free, and "we do not." The compromise reached in this

case is that the Soviet government has taken "upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice to the Bulgarian government with regard to the desirability" of including in the cabinet of the Fatherland Front (now being formed) two additional representatives of "other democratic groups," that is groups representing the Opposition, which declined to participate in the elections on the ground that it was not given an equal opportunity at the polls.

More far-reaching than the political agreements on Europe was the decision of the Big Three—who, according to Mr. Byrnes, at no time discussed the technical or scientific aspects of the atomic bomb—to recommend the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. This commission will be responsible to the Security Council of the UNO, and will be composed of one representative from each of the eleven nations on the Council, and Canada (which played an active part in the discovery of the atomic bomb) when that country is not a member of the Security Council. The terms of reference laid down for this commission follow closely those agreed upon by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada during Mr. Attlee's visit to Washington.

Viewed as a whole, the agreement reached at Moscow cannot be described as merely dictation by the great powers of set terms to the small nations. It constitutes another attempt—and many others will have to be made in the years ahead—to find a workable compromise between the aspirations of the Big Three, as well as between the Big Three and the smaller nations. Although the smaller states are not necessarily more selfless than the great, their intrinsic weakness makes them more dependent on an effective international organization for their security, and for that measure of justice and human understanding without which any peace would be merely a scrap of paper. VERA MICHELES DEAN

### UNITED STATES ACCEPTS ALLIED CONTROL OF JAPAN

As a result of the agreements concluded by the Big Three at Moscow, 1946 is opening in a more hopeful atmosphere in Asia than seemed possible a few weeks ago. In drawing up their first far-reaching peacetime accord, paralleling the wartime pacts of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, the great powers have given the world new reason to hope that the unity which made military victory possible can be recreated to preserve the peace.

The most significant of the Far Eastern agreements is the accord on Japan, under whose terms American control is to be merged into an eleven-nation set-up in which the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and China will each have a veto power over the

formulation of new policies or the modification of those already in existence. At the same time the Supreme Commander, General MacArthur, will retain significant powers, and the United States will have the most important single voice among the Big Four. This clearly is a compromise between the original American view that other nations should be limited to an advisory role in the administration of Japan, the Russian demand for four-power control machinery in Tokyo, and the British desire to have more than the power to advise.

**MACARTHUR'S OBJECTIONS.** General MacArthur announced on December 30 that he objected to the control arrangements, but would try to make

them work. He did not specify the reasons for his disapproval, but sympathetic Congressional and newspaper circles have attacked the control machinery on the ground that it deprives MacArthur and the United States of a dominating position in Japan.

Unquestionably the plan drawn up by the Big Three, with the concurrence of China, is a complicated scheme, containing many possibilities of friction and requiring the highest degree of tact and good will on the part of the powers and their representatives. But international cooperation is always a more complex matter than action by a single state, and the arrangements for Japan could hardly be simple in view of the divergent attitudes that had to be reconciled within a single formula. The most important fact is that the three foreign ministers were able to agree on a cooperative policy, an objective which properly overrides other considerations. With regard to General MacArthur, the Moscow accord is in no sense a reflection on his services; but, like all American occupation officials—and this was true of General Eisenhower in Germany—he is necessarily subject to a higher political authority.

**INDEPENDENCE FOR KOREA?** The intention to create a four-power trusteeship of the United States, the U.S.S.R., China and Britain "for a period of up to five years" before Korea becomes independent touched off several days of demonstrations in the American-held southern zone of that country. It is understandable that the Koreans should wish immediate independence and that the word "trusteeship" therefore arouses their fears. Nevertheless, the agreement is an important step forward, since in addition to pledging the coordination of the Russian and American occupation zones and the creation of a "provisional Korean democratic government," it substitutes a maximum period of foreign control for the vague promise of the Cairo declaration that Korea is to become independent "in due course." Moreover, as Secretary-Byrnes announced in his radio address of December 30, the joint Soviet-American commission which is to work with the provisional Korean government "may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship."

It is now up to the Koreans to do their best to make the trusteeship unnecessary and to reduce the period of foreign control to a minimum, while it is incumbent on American opinion to seek the earliest end to the occupation consistent with the establishment of a functioning Korean state. In Korea, however, as in Japan, many dangers of American-Russian friction will exist over such questions as the per-

sonnel of the provisional Korean régime and the arrangements for coordinating the Russian and American zones.

The least specific section of the Far Eastern decisions is the statement about China, which does not provide for joint action on particular problems, but simply asserts the common desire of the Big Three "for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government and for the cessation of civil strife." The declaration will strengthen General Marshall's position in China, but perhaps its most positive feature is the reference to "broad participation in all branches" of the Central government, since this amplifies President Truman's policy statement of December 15, calling for "a fair and effective representation" of Chinese opposition elements in "a broadly representative government." This wording suggests that the United States would not consider an offer of a few Central government posts as meeting the purposes of General Marshall's mission.

On the crucial question of Soviet troops in Manchuria and American forces in North China the statement declares that Byrnes and Molotov "were in complete accord on the desirability of withdrawal . . . at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities." The Soviet forces, at the request of the Chungking government, are scheduled to remain until February 1, but no time limit has been set for the American troops which, according to Byrnes' address of December 30, will be withdrawn from North China "when the Japanese troops are disarmed and deported from China or when China is able to complete the task unassisted by us." If recent announcements by General Wedemeyer represent long-term American policy, this task is expected to take quite some time.

The willingness of American political leaders to seek compromise formulas, in accordance with the desire of public opinion, has made it possible to retrieve some of the ground lost at the London Council of Foreign Ministers. Yet it must be emphasized that all the agreements, including those on the Far East, are no more than formulas that remain to be applied. If they are to be carried out with a minimum of friction, both the home governments of the powers and their representatives abroad must continue to show the same flexibility that made it possible to draw up the Moscow accord.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER


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# Washington News Letter



## FEAR OF CIVIL WAR IMPEDES OUSTING OF FRANCO

The State Department is at present awaiting a note from the French Foreign Office to learn whether the French government is willing to summon a conference at which the United States, Britain and France could discuss whether the three countries would serve their best interests by taking steps for the ouster of General Francisco Franco as Caudillo of Spain. Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, invited the United States and Britain early in December to disclose their attitude toward severing diplomatic relations with Franco. Uncertain whether Bidault put the question merely to placate the three leading French political parties—Communists, Socialists and Popular Republicans—each of which has demanded that France break with Franco, or really wanted international action, the United States replied that it would participate in a conference on the subject. The next move depends on France.

**FRANCO SEEMS SECURE.** While the United States respects France's interest in its neighbor, Spain, it still doubts that foreign pressure could unseat Franco without a bloody Spanish upheaval, which this country is anxious to avoid. Despite many predictions during World War II that Franco could not long survive its end, El Caudillo appears to diplomatic observers to be firmly entrenched in office. The Spanish police and the army stand firmly by him, and it may be that, as long as there is no rift in the loyalty of the troops, foreign incitations of the Spanish people to revolt will prove vain. The many Spaniards who oppose him are stayed from action by memories of the horrors of the civil war of 1936 to 1939. Meanwhile Franco keeps the opposition of the pre-Republic traditionalists softened by suggestions such as he made on July 17, 1945, that in time he will return the monarchy to Spain. Nevertheless, Spaniards in exile insist that rebellion in Spain could quickly be touched off from the outside.

**ANTI-FRANCO FORCES DIVIDED.** The refugee resistance to Franco has been so divided on all questions except a common desire to oust El Caudillo that its membership does not offer an effective agency through which the United States could intervene. The exile government in Mexico City, of which Jose Giral was named prime minister on August 22, 1945, is at odds not only with the Spanish communists but also with Juan Negrin, the last prime minister of republican Spain, who in turn differs with Fernando de los Rios, last republican ambassador to the United States. However, on December 28,

1945, Dolores Ibarruri, secretary-general of the Spanish Communist party, wrote to all the anti-Franco exiles proposing a meeting at Paris to reconcile their differences.

When Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson received Negrin at the State Department on December 15, he only sought information and made no suggestion that the United States would favor Negrin among the other exiles. The reception of Negrin constituted an unfriendly action toward Franco, but El Caudillo already knew that the United States disliked him. This country, it will be recalled, joined in the Potsdam Declaration barring Spain from the United Nations Organization as long as it remained under Franco's rule.

**CAN BIG THREE AGREE?** The possibility is said to exist that the United States would consent to breaking relations with Spain if France, which has only partial relations with that country, presented a sound argument that such a step might cause Franco to withdraw under peaceful conditions. Ambassador Norman Armour returned to the United States on December 21, after seeking in vain for a wedge to drive out Franco. The United States will not replace him, but it continues to maintain its Embassy in Madrid. Washington has found the Spanish government cooperative in disclosing the whereabouts of Germans in Spain whom the Allies want expelled and in breaking up German economic interests in Spain. But the Franco government is discriminating against our commerce by the application of his autarchical economic policy, which limits imports from the United States by stingy allocation of foreign exchange.

The decision of the United States and France on Spain would be affected strongly by Britain's attitude toward the advisability of severing relations with Franco. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin has said that his government "detests the Franco régime," but Britain, at a time when its sources of imports are few, may not want to jeopardize the flow of food and raw materials it obtains from Spain under favorable trade relations. The long-standing British desire that Franco give way to a monarchy is said to be weakening, but the question remains whether France, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union could readily agree on the successor régime they would prefer.

BLAIR BOLLES